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The publisher performed an authenticated act of publication — proving control of a namespace in the official MCP registry, or appearing in a first-party catalogue an operator curates. That establishes WHO published it. It is not a security finding, and attested artifacts carry Flagged verdicts too.
This artifact ships from 2 sources and their verdicts differ. The worst is github (Flagged). Installing from a cleaner source does not mean the others are safe — check the source you actually install from.
github: https://github.com/tripsyapp/cli, 24 findings
Choose your runtime: the CLI writes the mcpServers config entry for that target.
nerlo install --target claude-code -- cli
Install respects the composite badge: Clean proceeds, Caution prompts for confirmation, and Flagged is refused. Write operations require an API token.
6 of 11 scanners examined this package. The rest do not apply to it — language, ecosystem and packaging decide which analyzers can say anything, and a scanner that cannot examine an artifact reports nothing rather than passing it.
v2.0.11
9 findings · 6.8s
v0.3.74
4 findings · 1.2s
v0.1.0
0 findings · 3.7s
v0.1.0
3 findings · 3.7s
vv0.3.2
Incomplete run
0 findings · 0.4s
v0.1.0
0 findings · 13.2s
v1.4.0
None of the entry points this scanner reads were found in this artifact. What each scanner covers
0 findings · 0.2s
No report in this scan: govulncheck, osv-scanner, trivy, trivy_image.
1 scan on record. Every scan's full results are retained immutably for 24 months.
| Completed | Composite | Change | Scanners | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Aug 22, 2026 | Scan Halted | — | agentshield ·n/a: not applicablecisco-skill-scanner: completeagent-audit-kit: completenerlo-behavioral: completenerlo-install-instruction: completecapslock ·!: incompletenerlo-multi-source: complete | rejected |
Findings in files this artifact installs stand as reported; a model re-read the rest and said which ones it believes are false positives. This is a second opinion published beside the evidence, not a correction to it: the per-scanner reports above are unchanged, every dismissed finding is still listed there at its original severity, and the score and the Flagged badge are computed from those raw severities alone. Nothing below moved them.
Out of 16 findings across every scanner that examined this package.
Two keys had to turn. The model had to name a reason from a fixed list of six, and a deterministic check of ours — over which files this artifact actually installs — had to independently agree. Anything it could not corroborate is in “not reviewed” above, at full severity.
3 Agent instruction file — The match is in a file that instructs an AI coding agent — a CLAUDE.md or similar. It is documentation of intent, and our own check confirmed it is not part of what gets installed.
Rules: AAK-AGENT-002 · Files: AGENTS.md · reported by agent-audit-kit
These findings are in files this artifact installs and are not placeholder values. No false-positive basis can be corroborated for such a finding, so this review never dismisses one; they were not sent to the model and stand at their scanner's severity.
5 PIPELINE_TAINT_FLOW
Files: /repo/scripts/install.sh, /repo/skills/tripsy/SKILL.md, /repo/SKILL.md and 1 more · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
3 opt.nerlo-rules.nerlo-install-pipe-to-shell
Files: /repo/README.md, /repo/scripts/install.sh, /repo/skills/tripsy/SKILL.md · reported by nerlo-install-instruction
2 MANIFEST_MISSING_LICENSE
Files: /repo/skills/tripsy/SKILL.md, /repo/SKILL.md · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
1 AAK-MCP-HTTP-NOAUTH-SERVER-001
Files: Dockerfile · reported by agent-audit-kit
1 COMPOUND_EXTRACT_EXECUTE
Files: /repo/scripts/install.sh · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
1 SOCIAL_ENG_VAGUE_DESCRIPTION
Files: /repo/SKILL.md · reported by cisco-skill-scanner
Shell execution and unauthenticated server access risks identified.
The artifact's installation scripts and documentation include instructions that pipe directly to a shell, enabling arbitrary shell execution. It also contains code that performs compound extract and execute operations within `/repo/scripts/install.sh`. Furthermore, a Dockerfile exposes an unauthenticated HTTP server, and a high-severity pipeline taint flow is present in `/repo/scripts/install.sh`.
Concern level assessed by the review: High. This is the review's scale, not the registry badge.
Reviewed by gemini-2.5-flash. The model sees the findings, not your code, and cannot change a score.